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DECISION CONFIDENCE AND ERROR-RELATED EEG POTENTIALS 
Zooming Into Neural Mechanisms Of Decision Confidence Through The Lens Of EEG 
 
Abstract  
 
Neural mechanisms responsible for feelings of certainty in reasoning and decision-making           
remain unclear. This thesis attempts to address this problem by examining the role of              
error-related EEG potentials (error-related negativity - ERN, error positivity - Pe) in decision             
confidence. The amplitude of these potentials has been shown to correlate with error             
detection and confidence ratings in simple perceptual decisions. In order to test whether this              
pattern holds in more complex decisions, we investigated activity changes in ERN and Pe in               
response to manipulations of decision confidence in an arithmetic reasoning task. In an EEG              
experiment, 49 participants had to quickly respond whether an equation (e.g. 9 * 7 = 65) is                 
correct or incorrect and then report their decision confidence. Task difficulty and response             
fluency were varied as manipulations of confidence. The results indicated that ERN and Pe              
did not mediate the effect of task difficulty on confidence. Response fluency impacted             
confidence only for simple decisions, and this effect was partially mediated by ERN. These              
results suggest that Pe could be an index of implicit cognitive control, whereas ERN tracks               
decision confidence in simple decisions and is susceptible to response fluency manipulations. 
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Elektroentsefalograafiline perspektiiv kindlustunde neuraalsetele mehhanismidele 
 
 
Kokkuvõte 
 
Mõtlemise ja otsustamisega kaasneva kindlustunde kujunemist kirjeldavad neuraalsed        
mehhanismid on siiani ebaselged. Üks viis nendele valgust heita, on küsida mis rolli             
mängivad vea-monitoorimisega seotud EEG sündmuspotentsiaalid (vea-negatiivsus - ERN ja         
vea-positiivsus - Pe) kindlustunde kujunemises. Varasemates uuringutes on leitud, et nende           
potentsiaalide amplituud korreleerub kindlustundega lihtsates tajulistes otsustustes. Kas        
sarnane muster kehtib ka keerukamat mõtlemist eeldavate otsuste tegemisel? Kas kontrollitud           
manipulatsioone kindlustundes saab seletada muutustega ERNi või Pe aktivatsioonimustrites?         
Nendele küsimustele vastamiseks viisime läbi EEG eksperimendi, kus 49 katseisikut pidid           
vastama, kas arvutiekraanile kuvatud võrrandite vastused (näiteks 9 * 7 = 65) on õiged või               
valed ning raporteerima oma kindlustunnet. Kindlustunde mõjutamiseks varieeriti ülesande         
raskusastet ja vastuse voolavust. Tulemustest selgus, et ülesande raskusaste mõju          
kindlustundele ei ole medieeritud ei ERNi ega Pe poolt. Lihtsa raskusastmega võrrandite            
puhul medieeris ERN osaliselt voolavuse mõju kindlustundele. Analüüsist järeldub, et Pe           
võiks indekseerida implitsiitset kognitiivset kontrolli, mis reguleerib käitumist sõltumata         
kogetud kindlustundest. ERN seostub kindlustundega vaid lihtsate otsutuste puhul ning on           
tundlik vastuse voolavuse mõjutustele. 
 
Märksõnad: ​kindlustunne, peastarvutamine, ERN, Pe, voolavus, ülesande raskusaste 
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Introduction 
Decision confidence is like a nose - although always present in our day-to-day             
experiences we remain unaware of it unless it is not explicitly referenced. And just like a                
nose has an important function within the respiratory system, decision confidence also has an              
important function regulating reasoning and adaptive behaviour (Luttrell, Briñol, Petty,          
Cunningham, & Díaz, 2013). Research with an aim to understand decision confidence dates             
back to the seminal years of experimental psychology (e.g. Peirce & Jastrow, 1884) and has               
been more recently re-established mainly within the study of perceptual decision-making           
(Yeung & Summerfield, 2012) and abstract reasoning (Griffin & Tversky, 1992; Shynkaruk            
& Thompson, 2006). From the perceptual decision-making perspective, there have been           
attempts to establish neural correlates of decision confidence for 2-option forced-choice tasks            
(e.g. Flanker task, Stroop task, dot count task). This research supports the conclusion that              
decision confidence can be predicted from electroencephalographic event-related potentials         
(ERPs) previously associated with error detection (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Selimbeyoglu,           
Keskin-Ergen, & Demiralp, 2012). These results suggest that a similar pattern should be             
observable for more complex decision-making/reasoning tasks, which have been mostly          
studied in the field of abstract reasoning (e.g. deductive/inductive inference or numeric            
reasoning). Surprisingly, as the two research strands have developed relatively separately           
(Cruz, Arango-Muñoz, & Volz, 2016), ​the prediction that error-related ERPs could underlie            
decision confidence has not been extended to more complex reasoning problems.  
This thesis is an attempt to synthesize the perceptual decision-making and abstract            
reasoning perspectives ​and answer the question, whether error-related EEG potentials          
mediate experimentally induced changes in decision confidence in a complex reasoning task.            
In the following, an overview of decision confidence, its determinants and neural correlates             
of error monitoring is given, which forms the background for defining an experimental study              
in which the theoretical predictions about the relationship between error-related EEG           
potentials and decision confidence were tested.  
 
Decision confidence  
Decision confidence can be defined as a belief about the validity of our own thoughts,               
knowledge or performance that relies on a subjective feeling (Grimaldi, Lau, & Basso, 2015).              
This definition states that decision confidence relies on a subjective feeling which has been              
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termed feeling of rightness (FOR) for high confidence (Thompson, Turner, & Pennycook,            
2011) or feeling of error (FOE) for low confidence (Gangemi, Bourgeois-Gironde, &            
Mancini, 2015). The term stems from metamemory research where study participants have to             
indicate their certainty about how well they performed in a memory test, which might often               
be at odds with the actual result (Koriat & Bjork, 2005). In a similar fashion, decision                
confidence is often measured as confidence rating on a discrete or continuous scale after a               
participant has made a decision in a reasoning or perceptual judgement task (Grimaldi et al.,               
2015). 
This definition also implies a distinction between object- and metalevel psychological           
processes (Flavell, 1979). Object-level processes refer to psychological activity that results in            
phenomena such as perceptions, decisions, emotions, and memories which generally          
represent bodily or environmental states. For example, thinking that the correct answer to the              
product of 15 and 7 is 105 results from object-level processing. Meta-level processes are a               
kind of re-representation - they represent states of object-level processes and are therefore             
crucial for cognitive control and self-regulation (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen,            
2001). Continuing the previous example, being confident that the provided answer of 105 is              
correct, is a result of meta-level processing. These kinds of metarepresentations presumably            
express underlying feelings for the accuracy of a given judgement and therefore play a              
regulatory role in adaptive decision-making. For example, FOR is taken to be a starting or               
stopping rule for analytic reasoning (Thompson et al., 2011) in the sense that if a reasoner                
feels that she is correct in her answer (high FOR), she will no longer try to re-evaluate her                  
decision or find flaws in it, which might result in overconfidence and sub-optimal action. On               
the other hand FOE results in low confidence and if it is not well calibrated, a person might                  
be susceptible to overthinking and anxiety. 
 
Metacognitive accuracy 
The accuracy of our confidence judgements has been subject to controversy. ​The            
basic question from this perspective is, are our confidence estimates a good guide to the               
quality of our decisions? For example - can we detect if we make errors in Flanker​1 or similar                  
forced-choice task? This relationship between object-level performance and its metacognitive          
evaluation has been termed metacognitive accuracy (Fleming & Dolan, 2012). The general            
finding seems to be that humans are reliable detectors of their own errors in many perceptual                
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decision tasks and they often exhibit compensatory behaviour after a mistake has been             
committed (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). However, the opposite trend has emerged in            
reasoning tasks, where participants are asked to evaluate their confidence after solving more             
complex problems. For example, Thompson and Shynkaruk (2006) asked whether people are            
accurate in their evaluations of confidence in solving deductive reasoning problems (e.g            
Premise 1: Some elephants are ill-mannered. Premise 2: Some ill-mannered beings are smart.             
Conclusion: Therefore some elephants are smart.). Participants of the experiment, having           
seen the problem, had to respond, whether the conclusion is valid, and evaluate their              
confidence about their decision. The results indicated that confidence ratings were often            
biased when compared to actual correct answers.  
An implication of this is that the computation of confidence for complex and simple              
decisions might rely on different brain processes. Although decision confidence might be            
accurate for simple perceptual judgments, its computation is influenced by heuristic factors            
which might not be well calibrated for more complex problems. In the study by Thompson               
and Shynkaruk (2006), it was also detected that the confidence ratings were influenced by              
believability of the conclusion, perceived difficulty of the problem and the time taken to              
make a decision. More recently it has been shown that the ease by which the answer comes to                  
mind (response fluency) also has an effect on FOR and decision confidence in more complex               
decision problems (Thompson et al., 2011). These results raise a question about the             
differences in computation of confidence in simple and complex decisions.  
An approach to investigate confidence computation differences in simple and          
complex decisions is through electroencephalographic analysis, which provides a window to           
underlying neural mechanisms of these processes (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). If the same             
mechanism underlies decision confidence for simple and difficult decision-making, then a           
similar pattern of neural correlates should be observed for their computation. However, if, as              
the behavioural level analysis suggests, decision confidence computation for complex          
decisions relies on different neural mechanisms than for simple decisions, a different neural             
pattern should be observed. Error-related EEG potentials provide a way to address this             
hypothesis by offering a window into the neural mechanisms that are known to be involved in                
driving decision confidence during simple perceptual decisions. 
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Error-related EEG potentials  
Error-related EEG potentials stem from studies of error-monitoring in perceptual          
decision-making (Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). The general idea is to measure test             
participants’ neuronal activity (via EEG, fMRI or other brain imaging technique) during            
responding in a speeded forced choice 2-option task (for example, evaluating which one of              
the two displayed batches has more dots in it) and then compare the activity under correct and                 
incorrect decisions. A major finding in this paradigm has been the identification of             
error-related EEG potentials - error-related negativity (ERN) and error-positivity (Pe)          
(Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, &           
Donchin, 1993).  
ERN is characterized as a fast negative spike in the EEG signal within 0-150 ms after                
committing an erroneous response (van Veen & Carter, 2006). The most likely neural origin              
for ERN has been located to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Yeung et al., 2004). The                
functional role ACC activity reflected in ERN in cognition is an active research interest.              
According to three main theories, ERN reflects a mismatch between expected and the actual              
representation; it is a signature of two incompatible streams of information and thirdly, and it               
indicates a negative feedback signal for learning (van Veen & Carter, 2006). The three              
theories are not necessarily incompatible. It is therefore likely that the ERN can reflect              
contributions from different functional processes.  
Following ERN, within 200-400 ms after a commission of an error, another            
error-related positive potential (Pe) has been identified (van Veen & Carter, 2006). Although             
its functional role is more ambiguous than in the case of ERN, it has been most clearly                 
associated with conscious processing of error (as opposed to unconscious processing for            
ERN) (Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005). In a more recent account of ERN             
and Pe, it has been argued that ERN is most clearly associated with error correction whereas                
Pe is an index of error detection (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012).  
Since perceptual choice tasks indicate that humans are rather well-calibrated in           
evaluating their response accuracy, it makes sense to ask whether ERN and Pe would be               
predictive for decision confidence in these tasks. This hypothesis was confirmed for ERN in              
Flanker task (Scheffers & Coles, 2000), in which ERN’s amplitude covaried with a rating of               
perceived accuracy for a given response. A second study (Selimbeyoglu et al., 2012) also              
supports the conclusion that ERN and Pe might be neural indexes of decision confidence - in                
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a modified Flanker task and a visual discrimination task where task difficulty was             
manipulated, Pe, as well as ERN were observed to correlate with decision certainty. In              
another study, participants had to evaluate the number of dots and report their confidence on               
a 6 point scale in each trial. It was observed that both ERN and Pe were on average                  
distinguishable for 6 levels of reported confidence - higher amplitude Pe was associated with              
higher confidence ratings (Boldt & Yeung, 2015). Interestingly, this association was           
independent of objective accuracy. This study suggests that Pe, rather than ERN is the most               
robust neural index of subjective decision confidence, although for both a clear relationship             
should be observable. 
 
The present study  
In summary, in simple perceptual decision tasks, a relationship between error-related           
EEG potentials (ERN, and Pe) and decision confidence has been established. This suggests             
that an implicit reading of decision confidence for these kinds of tasks could be made based                
on EEG activity (Selimbeyoglu et al., 2012). However, the conclusions are limited in scope              
because of the simplicity of the decision-making task and the correlational design upon which              
these conclusions are founded. The current study aims to fill these gaps by testing whether               
the ERN/Pe relates to decision confidence in a more complex mental arithmetic task and              
within an experimental design, which allows for explicit manipulations of decision           
confidence. We assume that if ERN and Pe truly represent neural responses that underlie              
decision confidence, they should mediate the effects of systematic manipulations of           
confidence on confidence ratings. If, however evidence for mediation is not detected, it could              
be argued that different neural mechanisms underlie computation of decision confidence. 
More precisely, we designed an EEG experiment, in which participants had to quickly             
respond whether an equation (e.g. 9 * 7 = 65) is correct or incorrect and then report their                  
decision confidence. Response fluency and task difficulty were used as manipulations of            
decision confidence, which we expected to have a robust effects based on previous literature              
(Cruz et al., 2016; Thompson et al., 2013) and a pilot study. We further hypothesized that                
more difficult equations will elicit higher ERN and Pe compared to less difficult decisions.              
We also hypothesized that responses with lower fluency will elicit higher ERN and Pe than               
disfluent responses. 
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Method 
The primary objective of the study design was to test whether the effects of difficulty               
and fluency on confidence are mediated by error-related EEG potentials. In order to do this,               
the experiment had a 2x2 within-subject factorial design with decision confidence and            
error-related EEG potentials as the dependent variables (DV). A priori power analysis for             
repeated-measures ANOVA with 2 factors indicated that 80% power for an alpha level of              
0.05 for a large effect size would be provided by a sample size of 52. Response fluency and                  
task difficulty were both treated as 2 level independent variables (IV). 
 
Participants 
55 volunteers (age between 18 and 65, 24 males) registered to the study through an               
online invitation distributed in Facebook and mailing lists of University of Tartu. Prior             
coming to the experiment, participants were asked to fill in two adapted questionnaires             
measuring Big-5 personality (Konstabel et al., 2017) and Need for cognitive closure (NFCC)             
traits (Redi, 2017; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). As compensation, participants were given            
personality feedback and an opportunity to win a 20-euros worth bookshop gift card. Students              
of psychology could also earn course credits. The project was approved by the Research              
Ethics Committee of the University of Tartu (application ​286/T-3)​. The basic research            
question and main analyses were pre-registered in ​Open Science Foundation          
online-environment, the registration document and other public study-related files are          
retrievable from ​https://osf.io/cj2rf/ ​. 6 participants had to be excluded from the main analyses             
due to technical issues in EEG recording. The final sample consisted of 49 participants.  
 
Experimental task and stimuli 
We designed a mental arithmetic task and implemented it with Psychopy (Peirce et             
al., 2019). This task was chosen, because it simultaneously satisfies many important criteria -              
it is suitable for objective measurement of accuracy, it requires symbolic as opposed to              
perceptual processing, it suggests simple ways for the implementation of confidence           
manipulations and it is applicable for gathering data over many trials, which is a requirement               
for an EEG study.  
In this task, a participant who is sitting behind a computer is required to quickly               
respond whether equations (e.g. 6 x 8 = 42) displayed for 2 seconds are correct or incorrect                 
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by clicking on a respective button on the screen (Figure 1). After giving a response, the                
participant is presented with a visual-analogue scale for 4 seconds to indicate her decision              
confidence at the time of responding. Each trial is initiated when a participant clicks on a                
respective button on the screen. Before each equation, a number is displayed for 0.5 seconds               
which represents an answer to the following equation and functions as a prime producing low               
fluency when the answer is incorrect and high fluency when the answer is correct. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. ​Arithmetic task trial structure. The choice options at the top of the “Correct or                
incorrect?” screen are “INCORRECT” and “CORRECT”. The question above the confidence           
scale translates as “At the time of responding, how certain were you in Your choice?”. 
  
Stimuli 
Each participant responded to a total of 160 two-multiplicand equations that were            
divided into 4 blocks so that each block would have equal distributions of difficulty and               
fluency. The equations were generated by picking numbers from 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 for both                 
multiplicands for the easy condition. For hard condition, one multiplicand was selected from             
a number from 16 to 19 and the other was either 4, 6, 7, 8 or 9. For half of the trials, the                       
displayed answers were correct and incorrect for the other half. The incorrect answers were              
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computed by adding or subtracting 2 from the correct answer so that the incorrect answer               
would begin with the same number as the correct one. After each block, participants were               
given feedback of correct answers in counts for the previous block and an amplified result of                
how well they did in comparison to a fictional study from the USA. The aim of this feedback                  
was to boost participant motivation. Between the 4 blocks, participants reported their            
emotional state and tiredness on visual-analogue scales.  
 
Procedure 
The experimental procedure for each participant took on average about 1 hour and 15              
minutes. The experiments took place in the Psychology Institute of University of Tartu.             
Participants who arrived at the experiment room were requested to sit behind an LCD              
monitor and asked to sign an informed consent which had also been sent to them earlier. Each                 
participant was introduced to the general setup of the experiment and the basic idea of EEG.                
The EEG cap was then fit, electrode holders were filled with conductive gel and the               
electrodes were attached. After setting up the electrodes, each participant was positioned to             
sit 80 cm from the monitor. They were then instructed to solve computation problems within               
limited time and high accuracy. Participants were shown how to respond with a mouse click               
and the visual-analogue confidence evaluation scale was explained to them with a reminder             
that they should report the confidence they felt during giving a response. During the              
experiment, the participants were left alone in the room. They were instructed to take breaks               
between 4 experimental blocks and that after the second block, the experimentator will come              
in to check whether EEG electrodes are properly connected. The experiment ended with             
participants filling a short follow-up questionnaire about their opinion of the task, research             
question and answering strategies. Participants were then briefed about the aims of the project              
and provided with a possibility to wash their hair.  
 
Design and Measures 
We compared the confidence and error-related EEG potentials in two levels of task             
difficulty which has been previously shown to have a robust effect on decision confidence              
(Cruz et al., 2016; Griffin & Tversky, 1992)​. In the experiment, task difficulty was              
manipulated by changing one multiplicand for half of the equations to a double-digit number              
(e.g. 16 * 7 = 102 as opposed to 6 * 7 = 42 for easy condition). For manipulation of fluency,                     
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we implemented an element of priming into the experimental task that involved presenting             
the answer to the following equation for 0.5 seconds right before the equation was displayed.               
Since half of the answers for the equations were correct and half incorrect, the primed               
number was expected to either facilitate (when prime was directing to a correct answer - e.g.                
42 before 6 * 7 = 42) or impede (when prime was directing to an incorrect answer e.g. 40                   
before 6 * 7 = 40) giving the correct answer. Although fluency has been shown to have an                  
effect on decision confidence (Thompson et al., 2013), its effect has been observed to depend               
on task difficulty (Cruz et al., 2016)​. To validate the effectiveness of manipulations, we also               
recorded whether the provided answers were correct and what was the response speed for              
each answer.  
 
Dependent variables 
Decision confidence was measured on a visual-analogue scale from 0-100 with 4            
labels at the points of 0, 33, 66 and 100 (Figure 1). The question above the scale asked, “At                   
the time of responding, how certain were You in Your choice?”. The labels of the scale were                 
named starting from 0: “Very unconfident”, “Rather unconfident”, “Rather confident” and           
“Very confident”. 
To capture error-related EEG potentials (ERN, Pe) we used BioSemi ActiveTwo           
system with 32 electrodes referenced to two electrodes placed on earlobes. To eliminate eye              
movement noise from the signal, four electrodes were placed bipolarly on each participant             
vertical and horizontal ocular locations. BioSemi Actiview software was used to record the             
EEG signal with DMS/DRL reference scheme and 512 Hz sampling rate. EEG preprocessing             
was conducted in EEGLAB (Brunner, Delorme, & Makeig, 2013) 
All scalp channels were re-referenced to linked earlobes. Independent Component          
Analysis was used to computationally remove ocular artifacts. An ICA mixing matrix was             
obtained by running the Infomax algorithm on a training data consisting of 4-second epochs              
(-2000 to 2000 ms relative to the response) of 1 Hz high-pass filtered data cleaned of noisy                 
channels and epochs using EEGLAB automatic algorithms. Components corresponding to          
blinks and eye movements were identified visually and removed from the mixing matrix             
before using it to reconstruct the unfiltered continuous data. The ICA-pruned data were then              
low-pass filtered at 30 Hz and cut into epochs from -400 to 1000 ms relative to the response.                  
The mean voltage between -400 and -200 was subtracted as a baseline. Segments with              
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artifacts were automatically excluded based on the ±100μV threshold criterion. If any single             
channel would have been exclusively responsible for removing more than 2% of trials, the              
channel was removed. All removed channels were later spherically interpolated. After           
preprocessing, on average 67.1% (SD = 15.1%) EEG data in each design cell was retained for                
each participant.  
Following existing literature and visual inspection of the current waveforms, we           
defined ERN as the mean voltage at Cz and Fz between 0 and 175 ms and Pe as mean voltage                    
at Pz and Cz between 175-325 ms after a response was given.  
 
Data analysis 
R environment for statistical computing (R Core Team, 2013) with RStudio interface            
(RStudio Team, 2015) was used to conduct all the statistical analyses. The analyses were              
separated into behavioural manipulation validation and main analyses. The general aim of the             
behavioural manipulation validations was to demonstrate that the experimental manipulations          
were indeed effective. For all the statistical tests computed, the significance level was set to               
0.05, Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied for repeated-measures ANOVAs when the          
homogeneity of variances assumption was violated. For the main analyses, we conducted a             
multilevel mediation analysis, which allows determining whether the effect of an independent            
variable (IV) on a dependent variable (DV) can be explained by a third intervening variable               
M (Vuorre & Bolger, 2018). In the context of this study, this translates to whether the effects                 
of fluency (IV) and difficulty (IV) on confidence (DV) are mediated by ERN or Pe (M). 
 
Results 
Manipulation validation analyses 
The aim of the first analyses was to make sure that fluency and difficulty had indeed                
influenced decision confidence and response times and accuracy as expected. A mixed-model            
logistic regression with participant as a random factor indicated that fluency (β = 0.21),              
difficulty (β = -0.83) and their interaction (β = 0.57) had a statistically significant effect on                
response accuracy (all p < 0.001). Responses were more accurate on easy trials (p < 0.001),                
for which high fluency also had a facilitating effect. For hard trials, the fluency effect was                
reversed, so that low fluency condition resulted in more accurate responses (Figure 2A).  
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For response times, repeated-measures ANOVA showed significant main effects of          
fluency (F(1, 47) = 39.43, p < 0.001, η​2 ​= 0.05) and difficulty (F(1, 47) = 78.15, p < 0.001, η​2                     
= 0.30) as well as their interaction (F(1, 47) = 75.87, p < 0.001, η​2 = 0.05). This indicates,                   
that responding times were slower for difficult trials and high fluency condition accelerated             
responding only for easy trials (Figure 2B).  
Similarly for confidence ratings, there were significant main effects of difficulty (F(1,            
47) = 232,38, p < 0.001, η ​2 = 0.48), of fluency (F(1, 47) = 17.45, p < 0.001, η​2 ​= 0.01) as well                       
as their interaction and interaction (F(1,47) = 35.71, p < 0.001, η​2 = 0.02). Confidence was                
lower in hard trials and fluency manipulation was effective only in easy trials (Figure 2C). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. ​Mean response accuracy (A), response times (B) and confidence ratings (C) on              
y-scale compared in two levels of trial difficulty (on x-scale) and fluency (colour of the               
lines). 
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Main analyses 
For estimating the total variation in confidence ratings which can be explained by             
error-related potentials, we conducted repeated-measures correlation analyses separately for         
ERN and Pe with ​rmcorr ​R package (Bakdash & Marusich, 2017)​. To measure the strength               
of association, ​rmcorr provides a repeated-measures correlation coefficient (​r​rm​) ​which is           
similar to Pearson r (it takes values from 0-1, with 0 representing no association and 1 perfect                 
linear relationship), ​except that it is more suitable for repeated measures design, when there is               
a need to take into account between-subject variation. Results indicated that ERN had a small               
positive association with confidence ratings (r​rm​(5108) = 0.05, p < 0.001) whereas Pe had a               
small negative association with confidence ratings (r​rm​(5108) = 0.03, p < 0.05).  
 
Single-trial mediation analyses 
We ran four multilevel mediation models with R package ​bmlm (Vuorre & Bolger,             
2018) to determine, whether the experimental manipulations of difficulty and fluency on            
confidence ratings would be mediated by error-related ERPs. The ​bmlm package allows            
estimating Bayesian mediation models for data with repeated-measures experimental design.          
Each mediation model was estimated with 4 Markov Chain Monte Carlo chains with 10 000               
iterations for each chain. In each model, confidence ratings were treated as the dependent              
variable, difficulty (easy/ hard) and fluency (high/ low) as the independent variables and ERN              
or Pe as the mediators. To quantify the effects, we use non-standardized path coefficients (me               
for indirect effect and c` for the direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent                
variable). An effect is detected if the 95% credible intervals for the coefficient do not contain                
0. We also use pme (proportion effect mediated) which indicates the proportion of total effect               
explained by the mediating variable ranging from 0 to 1 (Vuorre & Bolger, 2018). 
The aim of the first two mediation models was to see whether the effect of difficulty                
on decision confidence would be mediated by ERN and Pe. We found that ERN did not                
mediate the effect of difficulty on confidence (indirect effect = -0.05, 95% CI = [-0.21, 0.01],                
proportion mediated effect = 0.00, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.01]). We also found that the effect of                 
difficulty on confidence ratings was not mediated by Pe (indirect effect = -0.02, 95% CI =                
[-0.08, 0.03], proportion mediated effect = 0.00, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.00]). In this model,               
however, an effect of difficulty on Pe was detected (a = 0.95, 95% CI=[0.28, 1.62]). This                
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indicates that although the effect of difficulty on decision confidence was not mediated by              
ERN nor Pe, the difficulty manipulation had an effect on Pe but not ERN (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. ​Differences in ERN and Pe for two levels of task difficulty. The plot captures the 
effect of the path a in the first and second mediation model. The shaded area denotes the 
standard error of the mean. 
 
The next analysis was concerned with whether the effects of fluency on decision             
confidence are mediated by error-related potentials. As the manipulation validations indicated           
that fluency did not have an effect on decision confidence in the hard trials, we conducted the                 
mediation analyses only for the easy trials. 
Mediation analysis for easy trials indicated that the effect of fluency on confidence             
was partially mediated by ERN (indirect effect = 0.15, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.03], proportion               
mediated effect = 0.02, CI = [0.00, 0.04]). The direct effect remained significant after taking               
ERN into account (c’ = 7.96, 95% CI = [5.75, 10.15]) (Figure 4). Although the effect was                 
small, this result corresponds to the idea that the fluency effect on decision confidence is               
partially mediated by ERN.  
The coefficient for path a which denotes the effect on fluency on ERN in easy task                
condition also excluded zero (a = 1.4, 95% CI = [0.55, 2.2]). This demonstrates that the                
fluency manipulation was effectively distinguished in ERN (Figure 5), which in turn has an              
effect on decision confidence (b = 0.11, 95% CI = [0.015, 0.2]) (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. ​Path diagram for the mediation model for ERN for easy trials. Point estimates (a, b,                 
c`) describe direct effects with associated 95% credible intervals. “SD” shows the effect’s             
standard deviation which indicates the degree of variation between participants.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Differences in ERN and Pe for high and low fluency trials for easy task condition.                 
The plot captures the effect of the path a in the third and fourth mediation model. The shaded                  
area denotes the standard error of the mean.  
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In the final mediation model, our aim was to see whether the effect of fluency on                
confidence ratings in easy task condition is mediated by Pe. Results indicated that fluency              
had a direct effect on confidence (c` = 7.98, 95% CI = [5.91, 10.18]), when taking Pe into                  
account, and it was not mediated by Pe (indirect effect = 0.01 , 95% CI = [-0.13, 0.26],                  
proportion mediated effect = 0.00, CI = [-0.02, 0.03]). For this model, no direct effect of                
fluency on Pe was detected (a = 0.80, 95% CI = [-0.17, 1.83]), the differences in Pe for two                   
levels of fluency in are visually displayed on Figure 5. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of the current thesis was to understand the relation of error-related EEG              
potentials to decision confidence. To do this, we set up an arithmetic reasoning experiment              
with simultaneous EEG recording, in which we could systematically manipulate two known            
determinants of decision confidence: task difficulty and fluency. Our goal was to see whether              
the effects of these manipulations on confidence ratings would be mediated by error-related             
EEG potentials (ERN, Pe). 
We first confirmed that manipulation of task difficulty indeed had an expected effect             
on decision confidence, so that confidence ratings were on average lower in hard condition              
and higher in easy condition. The effect of task difficulty was further validated by analyses of                
reaction times and response accuracy - easy equations were solved on average more             
accurately and with less time than hard equations. For fluency, an effect on confidence was               
detected only in low but not in hard condition. As expected, confidence ratings on easy trials                
were higher in high fluency condition and lower in low fluency condition. This dynamic was               
also supported by response times and accuracy. 
We also found a reversed effect of fluency on accuracy for hard trials, so that low                
fluency resulted in higher accuracy. A way to explain this effect is to appeal to general                
heuristic rules that participants tended to use. One of the heuristics for hard trials (e.g. 16 * 7                  
= 114) was to see whether the product of the second digit in the first number and the second                   
multiplicand (e.g. 6 * 7 = 42) ends with the same number as the solution of the equation                  
(114). If this is not the case, then a mistake is made very rarely if one responds “incorrect”.                  
However, if the numbers match (e.g. the answer would be 112), then the correct answer is                
more uncertain since there are more possible options for an answer ending with the final               
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number of the product (e.g. 102). The use of this heuristic was also reported by many                
participants in the questionnaire following the experiment. 
We set up 4 hypotheses, to quantify the extent to which ERN and Pe mediate the                
effect of fluency and difficulty on confidence ratings. Our first pair of hypotheses were that if                
ERN and Pe underlie the computation of decision confidence, a manipulation of task             
difficulty on confidence should be mediated by ERN and Pe. We found no support for these                
hypotheses as no indirect effect for ERN nor Pe on decision confidence were detected. The               
second pair of hypotheses were concerned with whether the fluency effect on confidence             
would be mediated by ERN and Pe. As our manipulation validation indicated no effect of               
fluency in hard task condition, we ran two mediation models for only easy trials. Results               
showed that evidence for partial mediation of fluency by ERN on confidence was detected.              
For Pe, however, there was no evidence for a mediated relationship.  
The fact that task difficulty effect on confidence was not mediated by error-related             
EEG potentials has implications for the theory about how metacognitive representations (e.g.            
confidence) contribute to adaptive decision-making. A proposed role for metarepresentations          
is to allocate mental resources (e.g working memory) for more flexible behaviour when             
necessary (Botvinick et al., 2001; Thompson et al., 2011). This function, also called             
“cognitive control”, has been associated with the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) on the             
neuronal level, which has also been localized as the source of ERN and Pe (Botvinick et al.,                 
2001; Shackman et al., 2011). The results from this study challenge the claim that ACC is                
always responsible for generating signals that allocate cognitive control resources (Gangemi           
et al., 2015; Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013). More specifically, if ACC is responsible              
for the monitoring for the recruitment of cognitive control, we should have observed a pattern               
in ERN and Pe in which hard problems elicit larger amplitude ERNs and Pes than easy                
problems. The data from this study, however, indicates that this is not the case for ERN,                
which is insensitive to task difficulty and does not mediate its effect on decision confidence. 
An effect of difficulty on Pe was detected, which indicates that Pe, which has also               
been associated with error-awareness (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012) is also sensitive to task             
difficulty. But this activity does not in turn manifest in confidence ratings, which generates a               
puzzle: on the one hand, difficulty has an effect on both - decision confidence and Pe, but                 
they seem to be unrelated in the sense that although Pe indexes difficulty, it does not in turn                  
contribute to confidence ratings. This indicates that although the effect of difficulty on             
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confidence is not mediated by ERN nor Pe, it is possible that Pe could be tracking cognitive                 
control processes that remain implicit in the sense that they do not contribute to the feeling of                 
confidence. These processes may thus be inaccessible for verbal reports (Shea et al., 2014),              
but could nevertheless have an adaptive regulatory function over behavioural responses. A            
remarkable example of this is a neurological patient, with damaged ACC, who did not report               
increased mental effort with increased task difficulty, although she clearly allocated more            
resources to the task when it was harder to solve (Naccache et al., 2005).  
To sum up, the results from the first two mediation analyses demonstrate a             
dissociation between error-related EEG potentials and confidence ratings, which indicates          
that a simple theory, according to which ERN and Pe underlie computation of decision              
confidence is not supported. The results are more aligned with a model in which Pe is an                 
implicit index of task difficulty that is not accessible for verbal reports.  
The second pair of mediation analyses with fluency as the independent variable            
suggest a more nuanced picture in which error-related EEG potentials relate to confidence             
ratings but only for simple decisions. Validation analyses indicated that fluency only had an              
effect on decision confidence in easy trials. A similar difference in the effectiveness of              
fluency manipulation on confidence has also been previously observed in a mathematical            
reasoning task (Cruz et al., 2016). The authors explain this by arguing that fluency only               
influences feelings of error up to a point where the effort to solve the problem disrupts the                 
link between fluency and confidence. Based on this, it could be argued that the neural system                
susceptible to the effect of fluency is the previously introduced metacognitive           
error-monitoring system associated with ACC activity and ERN/Pe (Yeung et al., 2004;            
Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). This hypothesis is in line with the evidence from the              
mediation models with fluency as the independent variable. The model indicated that the             
effect of fluency on decision confidence was partially mediated by ERN. As expected - ERN               
amplitude was more negative in high fluency condition which in turn was manifested in              
lower confidence ratings. This is consistent with the idea that for simple decisions confidence              
is an outcome of a pattern-matching error-detection system which is subject to fluency             
effects, whereas for more complex decisions this mechanism is no longer solely responsible             
for confidence computations.  
These results can be taken as a support for a theory, in which ERN contributes to                
decision confidence in simple decisions. Moreover, the results suggest, that the           
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error-monitoring system associated with ACC can be influenced by manipulation of answer            
fluency. Although Pe shows a similar pattern in two conditions of fluency (Figure 5), this               
effect was not found to be significant. 
 
Contributions, limitations and further questions 
Understanding of neural mechanism for decision confidence has important         
consequences for our understanding of metacognition and cognitive control. A relevant           
practical example is a study in which brain-computer interface which provided participants            
feedback about ERN and Pe resulted in 21% more accurate responses in a visual              
discrimination task (Parra, Spence, Gerson, & Sajda, 2003). The current approach in which             
we tried to untangle the behavioural level effects on confidence by theoretically relevant             
neural activity patterns contributes toward understanding our reasoning and decision-making          
in multiple ways.  
First, the results suggest, that at the current state of knowledge, the implicit             
measurement of decision confidence through error-related EEG potentials is more tractable           
for relatively simple decisions for which error is clearly definable as a representation conflict.              
This does not necessarily imply that confidence in more difficult decisions cannot be             
implicitly measured. Rather the concept of difficulty warrants more rigorous behavioural           
level analysis, which could be then adequately mapped onto relevant neural mechanisms            
(Krakauer, Ghazanfar, Gomez-Marin, MacIver, & Poeppel, 2017). Currently, difficulty can          
be thought of as an emergent property in reasoning, which could arise for various reasons               
(too much information, not enough time, too many necessary operations, etc). This notion is              
therefore highly variable for different tasks and the question “What makes a problem             
difficult?” warrants a detailed analysis in each setting, in order to capture this on the               
neurobiological level. It is possible that a similar study design would benefit from a more               
specific manipulation of confidence since the current result indicate that the partial mediation             
effect of ERN is relatively small compared to the total effects of difficulty and fluency.  
The main contributions of the current study are the discovery that fluency effect on              
confidence is partially mediated by ERN for simple decisions and that Pe tracks task              
difficulty but does not mediate confidence ratings. These results set constraints on the             
development of metacognitive theory of decision-making and reasoning, by arguing that           
error-processing in the brain works in different ways for easy and difficult problems. The              
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effect of fluency on ERN also provides a window into manipulating ERN for various further               
research questions. For example, it would be important to replicate this result in a simple               
perceptual task, to see, whether the effect of fluency would be more pronounced.  
Another question inspired from these results is about the relationship between           
negative affect and confidence. It has been shown that negative affect is associated with              
greater ERN and Pe (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2004; Shackman et al., 2011).             
Accordingly, ERN and Pe could be interpreted as signals that convey information about             
uncertainty which in the case of high probability of error is experienced as a negative feeling                
(FOE) and should result in low ratings of confidence. However, as the data from the current                
study suggest, even if negative affect is manifested in confidence ratings, it is not to be                
associated with ERN or Pe. It could also be the case that although higher Pe is associated                 
with negative affect, this affective experience does not contribute to confidence ratings.            
Therefore in future studies, it would be interesting to see if Pe would mediate difficulty               
effects on negative affect. This avenue of research should be further investigated, as it is often                
taken for granted that negative noetic feelings result in low confidence ratings.  
Finally, the study extends the relationship between decision confidence and          
error-related EEG potentials to arithmetic reasoning task. This is important, because it shows             
the validity of the conclusion, that ERN and Pe contribute to confidence in different              
decision-making tasks. To extend these claims, it would be beneficial to address the             
ecological validity of the decision-making task and consider more nuanced manipulations of            
decision confidence in future studies.  
The current thesis provides evidence that ACC activity is related to confidence in             
simple pattern-matching decisions, but not in decisions which require more complex           
reasoning. Error-related negativity is supported to be an index of decision confidence for             
simple decisions whereas Pe can be thought of as a manifestation of implicit cognitive              
control. As these are ​post-hoc explanations, further experiments should be designed to test             
them.  
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